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ABSTRACT
Does exposure to the refugee crisis fuel support for extreme-right parties? Despite heated debates
about the political repercussions of the refugee crisis in Europe, there exists very little—and sometimes
conflicting—evidence with which to assess the impact of a large influx of refugees on natives’ political
attitudes and behavior. We provide causal evidence from a natural experiment in Greece, where some
Aegean islands close to the Turkish border experienced sudden and drastic increases in the number
of Syrian refugees while other islands slightly farther away—but with otherwise similar institutional and
socioeconomic characteristics—did not. Placebo tests suggest that pre-crisis trends in vote shares for
exposed and non-exposed islands were virtually identical. This allows us to obtain unbiased estimates
of the electoral consequences of the refugee crisis. Our study shows that among islands that faced
a massive inflow of refugees just before the September 2015 election, vote shares for Golden Dawn,
the most extreme-right party in Europe, moderately increased by 2 percentage points (a 44 percent
increase at the average). Our findings have implications for the theoretical understanding of the “flash
potential” of immigration politics as well as for the management of refugee flows.
INTRODUCTION
Countries across the globe are struggling to cope with the most severe refugee crisis since the aftermath
of World War II. Since the spring of 2015, more than 2 million (UNHCR 2017) new asylum claims
were submitted in Europe alone, most of them from Syrian refugees who crossed into Europe via the
Mediterranean Sea. In addition to the direct financial costs and economic consequences (Foged and Peri
2016) that transition and receiving countries bear, the crisis has resulted in severe political repercussions
in many destination countries, including protests against asylum seekers and political violence directed
at refugees (Board 2015). Perhaps most importantly, the ongoing refugee crisis may also have long-
lasting electoral consequences by affecting natives’ political preferences and their attitudes toward asylum
seekers.
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Does the influx of refugees increase support for extreme-right parties? Despite heated debates about
asylum policies and the allocation of refugees across Europe (Bansak et al. 2017), there exists very little
evidence regarding the impact of refugee arrivals on native voters’ political preferences and behavior.
While there is a sizeable literature that documents a positive relationship between labor migration and
vote shares for anti-immigrant parties in receiving countries (Barone et al. 2016; Becker et al. 2016;
Brunner and Kuhn 2014; Halla et al. 2015; Mendez and Cutillas 2014), it is unclear how these findings
translate to the context of refugee migration. Since humanitarian concerns are particularly important
in structuring native attitudes towards asylum seekers (Bansak et al. 2016), we would expect that host
communities are ceteris paribus more welcoming to refugees than to labor migrants. Only recently have
two seminal studies attempted to isolate the effects of refugee migration on electoral outcomes in Austria
(Steinmayr 2016) and Denmark (Dustmann et al. 2016), with partially contradictory conclusions. This
lack of knowledge is particularly problematic with respect to countries that have experienced a large
influx of refugees within a very short period of time, such as Greece, which received more than 50% of
all refugees crossing into Europe in 2015 (UNHCR 2016).
When trying to isolate the effect that exposure to refugees has on the political attitudes and behavior
of the host population, the key problem for causal inference is that the number of arrivals is far from
randomly assigned. Instead, the process through which refugees select between different potential host
countries and communities depends on factors such as religious or cultural proximity, labor market condi-
tions, and openness toward refugees (Neumayer 2004). In other words, refugees will, as much as possible,
flee to communities that they can reach and where they are welcome. This selection process severely con-
founds most existing comparisons of the political responses of natives to the presence of asylum seekers
and refugees. If we find that communities that experienced a large influx of refugees are less (or more)
supportive of anti-immigrant parties than places that have not, we cannot conclude that these differences
are caused by refugee arrivals, because the selection ensures that these two groups of communities are
also different on many other confounding characteristics.
By focusing on Greece, one of the European countries most affected by the current refugee crisis, we
overcome this issue by taking advantage of a natural experiment to identify the electoral consequences of
refugee arrivals. As the refugee crisis unfolded in the waters of the Aegean in spring 2015, Greek islands
were differentially exposed to the influx of refugees merely because they were closer to or farther away
from the Turkish coast where boats with refugees departed. For example, the island of Lesvos (with a
population of about 80,000) received more than 200,000 asylum seekers between May and September
2015. Yet the neighboring island of Lemnos, which belongs to the same geographical and administrative
unit and features similar socioeconomic and political conditions, did not receive any refugees over this
period, simply because it is a few miles farther away from the Turkish coast (see Figure 1, Panel A, for a
map of the Aegean Sea).
Several factors facilitate our identification strategy. First, among the 95 habitable islands in the
Aegean Sea, distance to the Turkish border caused significant variation in the number of refugees ar-
riving in each of these islands. Second, refugees tended to be housed within specific areas on each island.
This allows us to exploit both between- and within-island variation in the number of refugee arrivals.
Third, Greece held an election on September 20, 2015, right after the first wave of refugee arrivals that
the country encountered throughout the spring and summer of 2015. The previous election had taken
place only eight months prior in January 2015, before significant numbers of refugees arrived (see Fig-
ure 1, Panel B). The SI Appendix Sections S2.1 and S2.2 provide more information about the elections,
which took place in the context of the Greek financial crisis. Two more elections, both in 2012, also
serve as possible counterfactuals of support for extreme-right parties in the absence of the crisis. Fourth,
many of these islands belong to the same electoral and administrative district, which ensures that they are
identical across a plethora of observable and unobservable characteristics, such as the candidates running
for office, regional government, police, judiciary, and access to EU funds.
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Our study makes four main contributions. First, we provide rare causal evidence of the effects of
exposure to the refugee crisis on support for extreme-right parties. For a number of reasons, the Aegean
refugee crisis is an ideal case to test for the “flash potential” (Sniderman et al. 2004) of immigration
politics, when widespread concerns about asylum seekers (Bansak et al. 2016) coupled with a sudden in-
flux of immigrants are hypothesized to lead to large-scale electoral mobilization (see also Hopkins 2010).
Specifically, Greece received about 400,000 new asylum seekers between April 2015 and September 2015
(UNHCR 2016), which translates to more than 2.8 refugees per Greek resident in affected islands. These
sudden inflows reached their first peak just before the September 2015 election, thereby ensuring that
the refugee crisis would be a highly salient issue when island residents cast their vote in the midst of
the concurrent financial and economic crisis. The results suggest that this sudden and massive increase in
refugee arrivals indeed fueled support for the radical anti-immigrant and anti-asylum-seeker party Golden
Dawn (GD), but only moderately so: vote shares for GD increased about 2 percentage points (a 44 per-
cent increase at the average) because of the exposure to the refugee crisis. This increase in vote shares,
however, is statistically significant and substantively meaningful. GD became the third-largest (and minor
opposition) party in the fragmented Greek multi-party system, and was awarded certain constitutionally
protected privileges, such as the right to appoint the second deputy Speaker of the house and important
vice-chair positions in parliamentary committees. In a companion study, we fielded a targeted survey to
examine the impact of refugee arrivals on natives’ political attitudes and policy preferences (reference
suppressed to protect author anonymity).
Second, by employing within-island variation in proximity to refugee hotspots and measuring the
number of refugee arrivals per resident, we show that the intensity of exposure further catalyzes the
electoral boost of the extreme-right. Third, our study fills a gap by examining the political repercussions
of the refugee crisis in Greece, the European country arguably most affected by the current refugee
crisis and home to GD, the most extreme-right and neo-fascist party currently represented in a European
parliament (Heinö 2016).
Fourth, Greek islands served as temporary transit destinations during our study period, and most
refugees continued their journeys to Athens within 48 hours of arrival (Capon 2015). This very unusual
feature of our case enables us to make two important contributions to our theoretical understanding of the
drivers of anti-refugee attitudes. The refugees’ very temporary presence on the island eliminated most
avenues for sustained interactions between locals and refugees, a prerequisite for the contact theory to
work (Allport 1979). Hence, this setting allows us to isolate the impact of exposure to (rather than contact
with) refugee populations on political behavior—something that previous studies could not achieve. In
addition, our findings are difficult to reconcile with realistic group conflict theory (Campbell 1965), in
which competition for scarce resources is a necessary condition for conflict between the outgroup and the
dominant group. Our study shows that mere exposure is sufficient to fuel prejudice and change political
behavior.
THE UNFOLDING OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE AEGEAN SEA
Setting
Our study focuses on Greece, which was the main entry points to Europe, due to its proximity to the
Turkish border, a long coastline that marks the EU external borders, and many difficult-to-patrol islands.
Out of the 1.3 million new asylum seekers who reached European territory in 2015, more than 850,000 of
them did so by arriving in one of the Greek Aegean islands (UNHCR 2016). But while some islands were
strongly affected by these sudden refugee inflows, many other islands did not experience any contact with
refugees. Most refugees left the islands of first arrival within a very short period, typically less than 48
hours, to continue their journeys via the ports of Piraeus or Thessaloniki to central and northern Europe.
3
The SI Appendix Section S.2 provides more information about how the refugee crisis unfolded in Greece.
The geography and timing of the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea
25 Jan 2015 
 election
20 Sep 2015 
 election
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
01/14 07/14 01/15 07/15 01/16
Month / Year
M
on
th
ly 
Ar
riv
a
ls
Figure 1: Panel A shows that islands close to the Turkish border received the most refugee arrivals per capita.
Panel B shows the monthly number of asylum seekers arriving at Greek islands over the period from January 2014
to March 2016. During the study period, the first election took place just before the onset of the refugee crisis on
January 25, 2015. A second election took place at the height of the refugee crisis on September 20, 2015.
Data
This study draws upon a new panel data set that covers all habitable Greek islands. The units of analysis
are either municipalities (N = 95) or townships (N = 248). The data come from three different sources:
electoral outcomes (at the municipality and township level) are provided for all four elections between
2012 and 2015 by the official record of the Greek Ministry of Interior and Public Administration; monthly
data on refugee arrivals per island are provided by the UNHCR (UNHCR 2015), and geographic data on
island’s distance from the Turkish coast are obtained from the online mapping service Google Maps,
which provides satellite imagery and geospatial data visualization and measurement. The SI Appendix
Sections S3 and S4 provide more information about the data sources, descriptive statistics and coding
decisions.
Empirical Strategies
We employ two complementary empirical strategies to identify the causal effect of exposure to the refugee
crisis on electoral support for the GD. First, we apply a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator to obtain
an estimate of the effect of refugee arrivals on the September 2015 vote share for GD. The underlying
logic behind the design is that for the islands that received refugees in the summer of 2015, we construct
the counterfactual change in GD vote share between January and September 2015 had they not received
refugees, by using the change in GD vote share in the unaffected islands. This strategy yields causal
estimates so long as the parallel trends assumption holds. In the current context, this assumption implies
that the vote share for GD would follow the same trajectory from January to September 2015 among
treated and non-treated islands in the absence of the refugee crisis.
To assess whether this assumption holds and thus to evaluate the validity of the design, we turn to past
elections, exploring whether the over-time trend in GD vote share differs between treatment and control
units. The left panel of Figure 2 uses the municipality-level analysis, whereas the right panel depicts the
results from the township-level analysis. In both graphs two lines are shown, each representing the over-
4
time change in the vote share for GD from the first election of 2012 until the last election of 2015. The
red line denotes treated units, and the blue line denotes control units. We see that both groups travel in
parallel until September 2015, the first election after the onset of the refugee crisis in Greece. Moreover,
consistent with our expectation that the within-island variation helps to account more effectively for
unobservable differences in support for GD, we see that the treated and control groups are similar not
only in terms of changes, but also in levels before the refugee crisis. Taken together, the two graphs
strengthen our confidence in the validity of the DID design.
Parallel trends at the municipal and township level
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Figure 2: The analyses at the municipality (left panel) and township-level (right panel) show that treated and
control islands experience highly similar changes in support for GD prior to the refugee crisis, thereby strengthening
our confidence in the parallel trend assumption. The blue connected line indicates the average vote share for GD in
the municipalities (left panel) and townships (right panel) that received refugees. The red connected line denotes
the average GD vote share in municipalities and townships without refugee exposure.
The second empirical strategy employs an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to identify the impact
of the refugee crisis on the GD vote share. In particular, we use each island’s distance to the Turkish coast
as an instrument for the number of refugee arrivals. To test whether the first stage regression is sufficiently
strong (Stock and Yogo 2005), we must determine whether the islands closer to the coast were indeed
more likely to have received refugees than those farther away. Figure 3 shows that this the case. The
left panel displays the probability of having received any refugees as a function of the distance from
the coast. The blue curve represents a local regression smoother that is fitted to the data. We find a
monotonically descending relationship, indicating that the farther away an island is from the coast, the
less likely it is to have received any refugees during the current crisis. The right panel shows that the
same monotonically decreasing relationship exists for the intensity of refugee exposure (measured as the
relative number of refugee arrivals per island resident). Both graphs indicate that this relationship can be
accurately modelled by a logarithmic function (red line). Accordingly, we use logged distance from the
Turkish coast as an instrument of refugee exposure in the subsequent analysis.
The two identification strategies are complementary. The DID strategy is more efficient and identifies
the average treatment effect for the treated islands, but we have to rely on the parallel trend assumption. In
contrast, the IV strategy holds many potential confounders constant by design, but relies on the exclusion
restriction (Angrist et al. 1996), namely the assumption that the only way proximity to the Turkish coast
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Figure 3: First stage: islands’ distance from the Turkish coast predicts the number of refugee arrivals. The blue
curves denote the local linear regression smoother (span=0.5), with the shaded area capturing the 95% confidence
intervals. The left panel shows the propensity of receiving refugees against the distance to the Turkish coast,
whereas the right panel shows the number of refugee arrivals per capita against the distance. The red curves display
the predicted level of treatment exposure conditional on logged distance. In both graphs, the logarithmic function
of distance from the Turkish coast provides a good approximation to the data.
affects support for GD is through refugee arrival. The SI Appendix Section S5 provides more information
about the estimation strategy for the DID and IV analyses.
A placebo test confirms that control islands provide a credible counterfactual for treated islands. For
this, we exploit a particular feature of the Greek election law: Registered nonresident voters cast their
ballot in their town of residency, even when they do not live in the town they are registered in. We use
this group to examine the behaviour of nonresidents who live on the Greek mainland but are registered
to vote for islands with refugee exposure. These placebo tests, presented in the SI Appendix S6.3, reveal
that electoral support for GD did not change substantially among i) nonresident voters of treated islands
over time and ii) between nonresidents of treated and control islands.
RESULTS
Panel Data Estimates
Massive refugee arrivals from the Turkish coast to the Greek islands started in spring and escalated over
the summer of 2015. Our panel data estimates exploit that Greece held two elections in the same year,
one in January and one in September. Furthermore, refugee arrivals were highly clustered among a subset
of the Aegean islands. We use the cross-island as well as within-island variation (Figure S2, Panel A)
to assess the impact of refugee presence of vote share for GD (Figure S2, Panel B). Employing a DID
estimator, we treat the September 2015 election as the post-treatment election and the three last elections
preceding the January 2015 election as the pre-treatment elections. A detailed description of empirical
strategy is provided in the SI Appendix Section S5.
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Table 1 presents the main result and shows that refugee arrivals catalyze GD vote share.1 Model
1 uses municipalities as the unit of analysis and shows that in islands that received refugees, support
for GD rose by 2 percentage points (two-tailed p < 0.001). The average vote share for GD in 2015
among all municipalities in the estimation sample is 4.5 percentage points. Thus, the magnitude of the
backlash effect amounts to a 44 percent increase in the party’s vote share. Model 2 shows that the results
are virtually identical when adding linear municipality-specific trends that capture smooth changes in
unobserved confounders. Models 3 and 4 are the placebo analogues of Models 1 and 2, respectively.
They present the same result but using GD’s lagged vote share as the outcome. Reassuringly, we find no
effect of exposure to the refugee crisis on GD’s vote share in the previous election.
Models 5 and 6 use townships as the unit of analysis. Recall that townships are clustered within
municipalities and thus allow for within-island variation. The results are very similar to the municipality-
level analysis. We find that townships receiving refugees see an increase in the GD vote share by slightly
more than 2 percentage points (two-tailed p < 0.001) compared to townships that were not exposed to
refugee arrivals. Model 6 shows that the effect remains robust to the inclusion of township-specific linear
trends. This result suggests that the increase in the party’s vote share is not uniform within the affected
islands, but rather more concentrated among those areas directly exposed to the refugee crisis. The
placebo tests shown in Models 7 and 8 confirm that treated and control townships follow parallel trends
prior to the January 2015 election. The difference in the vote share for GD between treated and untreated
townships before that election is essentially zero, both with and without the inclusion of township-specific
trends.
Finally, Models 9 to 12 replace the binary treatment indicator with the per capita number of refugees
arriving in each island. Models 9 and 10 present the treatment effects and indicate that the arrival of
one refugee per resident increases GD’s vote share by 0.77 percentage points. To see more concretely
what this means, take Samos, which received approximately 2.5 refugee arrivals per resident. As a result,
the vote share for GD in September 2015 is expected to have risen by almost two percentage points
because of the refugee arrivals. This estimate remains robust when adding municipality-specific linear
trends. Models 11 and 12 display the placebo results, which use the lagged values of support for GD.
Reassuringly, we find that exposure to refugee arrivals in 2015 plays no role in the vote share for GD in
the pre-treatment elections. The average treatment effect is again very close to zero both with and without
municipality-specific trends. Figure S2 in the SI Appendix provides a visual summary of those results.
Instrumental Variables Estimates
Distance to the Turkish coast plays a key role in whether and how many refugees arrived on a particular
island in the Aegean in 2015. As discussed in the previous section, we exploit this natural experiment by
using distance from the Turkish coast as an instrument of refugee exposure.
Figure 4 illustrates the logic of the estimation strategy. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the change
in GD’s vote share, from May 2012 to January 2015, as a function of the (logged) distance of each island
from the Turkish coast. Since the Syrian refugee crisis impacted Europe only after the spring of 2015,
we expect no relationship between distance from the coast and support for GD. This is exactly what we
see in the right panel of Figure 4: The linear regression coefficient measuring the effect of distance to
the Turkish coast on change in GD support between May 2012 and January 2015 is 0.048 (two-tailed,
1 To address the intra-class correlation stemming from the panel structure of our data, we cluster standard errors at the munici-
pality and township level, respectively. To address further concerns about inference based on DID estimates (Bertrand et al.
2004), we also adopted three alternative inference strategies: i) block-bootstrapped standard errors (Table S9 in SI Appendix);
ii) collapsing all pre-treatment time points into one pre-treatment period (Table S10 in SI Appendix); and iii) placebo tests
based on permutation tests (Figure S8 in SI Appendix). All these analyses are described in more detail in the SI Appendix.
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Table 1: Impact of refugee arrivals on GD vote share
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Outcome: GD(t) GD(t−1) GD(t) GD(t−1) GD(t) GD(t−1)
Treatment: Binary treatment Binary treatment Binary treatment Binary treatment Arrivals per capita Arrivals per capita
Unit: Municipality Municipality Township Township Municipality Municipality
Exposure 2.079 2.112 -0.040 -0.055 2.272 2.193 0.093 0.127 0.604 0.600 -0.004 -0.033
(0.351) (0.674) (0.392) (0.713) (0.382) (0.552) (0.284) (0.417) (0.178) (0.264) (0.119) (0.262)
Unit FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Election FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Unit trends X X X X X X
N 380 380 285 285 992 992 744 744 379 379 284 284
Elections 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3
Clusters 95 95 95 95 248 248 248 248 95 95 95 95
Notes: Models 1–12 display ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Models 1-8 use a binary treatment indicator while models 9-12 use the number of refugee arrivals per capita. Models 1, 2, 5,
6, 9 and 10 show the effect on GD vote share (in red). Models 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 use the GD vote share from the previous
election as placebo outcome (in blue). All models control for election and unit of analysis (municipality or township) fixed
effects. In addition, models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 also include unit-specific linear time trends.
p < 0.782), i.e. close to zero and far away from conventional level of statistical significance. The
right panel of Figure 5 shows the same analysis but using the change in support for GD from January to
September 2015 as outcome. For this period, we estimate a linear regression coefficient of -0.433 (two-
tailed p < 0.001), indicating that after the crisis, proximity to the coast is associated with a significantly
higher increase in GD vote share.
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Figure 4: Intention-to-treat effect: Proximity to the Turkish coast increases GD vote share after the inflow of
refugees in September 2015, but has no impact on previous elections. The blue lines indicate linear OLS regressions
with 95% confidence intervals (shaded areas). The right panel shows the change in GD vote shares from January
to September 2015, the left panel shows the change in GD vote shares between May 2012 and January 2015. Both
graphs use the logged distance from the Turkish coast in the horizontal axis.
Table S3 in the SI Appendix presents the IV estimates, using the binary and the continuous treatment
indicator. Models 1 and 3 show the first-stage regression results. Both the binary and continuous measures
for refugee arrivals are negatively related to distance to the Turkish coast. The F statistic measuring the
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strength of the first stage is 46 and 31, respectively, well above the critical value (Stock and Yogo 2005)
of 10. Model 2 shows that the presence of refugees during 2015 increases the GD vote share by more
than two percentage points. Model 4 employs the continuous measure and shows that for an additional
refugee per capita the vote share for GD increases by almost one percentage point. Both estimates are
very close to those obtained using the DID design.2 Model 5 presents the intent-to-treat result using all
four elections since May 2012. The result shows that the effect disappears entirely when moving from
an island that is 2 km away from the Turkish coast (e.g. Samos) to an island that is almost 100 km away
(e.g. Karpathos).3
Taken together, both empirical strategies lead to the same conclusion: The refugee crisis resulted in a
statistically significant and politically substantial increase in electoral support for Europe’s most radical
right-wing party, GD. In the SI appendix, we extend this evidence in two related dimensions. First we
look at the intent-to-treat effect in greater detail, showing that distance to the Turkish coast predicts GD
vote share only in September 2015, but not in any previous election (see SI Appendix Table S5). Second,
we drop observations far from the Turkish coast. We use several cut-off points, ranging from 500 to 50
kilometer maximum distance to the coast. The results appear in Figure S7 of the SI Appendix and appear
remarkably robust to changes in the range of distance to the Turkish coast.
Is GD ‘stealing’ votes from other parties or mobilizing citizens that would otherwise abstain? While
a full analysis of the mechanism underlying these shifts in electoral support is beyond the scope of this
study, our data provides some evidence that allows us to examine these two hypotheses. The results,
shown in Tables S6 and S7 of the SI Appendix Section S6.5, show that the rise of GD caused by the
refugee crises did not affect the vote shares of the governing coalition parties of the leftist SYRIZA and
ANEL, but that the major opposition party Nea Dimokratia suffered significant electoral losses. This sug-
gests that a significant segment of voters turned from the center-right Nea Dimokratia, whose electoral
agenda was dominated by economic issues and the financial bail-out negotiations, to the extreme-right
GD, which established itself as the fiercest anti-immigrant and anti-asylum-seeker platform. At the same
time, the DID and IV results show that overall turnout increased significantly in treated islands, which
suggests that the refugee crisis also enabled GD to mobilize new voters who previously had not partici-
pated in elections.
CONCLUSION
This study exploits a natural experiment in the Aegean Sea to examine the effect of exposure to the refugee
crisis on natives’ support for extreme-right parties. Using two complementary identification strategies and
multiple outcomes and placebo tests, we find that in municipalities and townships that experienced sudden
and sizeable refugee inflows, electoral support for the extreme-right party GD increased by 2 percentage
points, a more than 40 percent increase at the average. These effects are further amplified by the degree of
exposure, measured by the number of refugees per resident who arrived in the treated islands. However,
given the size and suddenness of the refugee inflows, the ensuing chaos on affected islands just before the
election, and the concurrent economic downturn caused by the financial crisis—all factors that have been
2 Whereas the 2SLS estimator recovers the Local Average Treatment Effect, the DID estimator unpacks the Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATT). The similarity in the magnitude of the effects between the two estimation techniques suggests
low levels of non-compliance to treatment assignment status in the IV analysis.
3 The 95 municipalities in our analysis are nested within 20 prefectures. We account for this grouping by clustering standard
errors at the prefecture level. To explore whether our inferences are fragile due to the relatively low number of higher-level
prefectures, we repeat the IV analysis using bootstrapped standard errors (SI Appendix Table S4). All results are robust to
these alternative specifications.
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theorized to fuel electoral backlash (Sniderman et al. 2004)—we interpret the 2 percentage point increase
in GD vote shares as a relatively modest effect.
These findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of the dynamic nature
of attitudes toward asylum seekers. Mirroring findings from research on how immigration to the U.S. can
trigger local anti-immigrant sentiment and policies (Hopkins 2010), we find strong evidence that extreme-
right parties can successfully convert prevalent negative attitudes towards Muslim asylum seekers (Bansak
et al. 2016) into vote shares in times of crisis. Previous research on the electoral consequences of refugee
migration has found negative effects on support for far-right parties in Austria (Steinmayr 2016), lending
support to the theory that contact between natives and refugees alleviates animus (Allport 1979). Our
study shows that hostility prevails in the Greek context, where asylum seekers quickly continue their
journeys from the arrival island to the Greek mainland and extensive contact and interactions between
island residents and asylum seekers are therefore not possible. Given the only temporary presence of
the refugee population on most of these islands, our findings are also hard to reconcile with theories of
realistic group conflict (Campbell 1965), which posits that conflict between the outgroup and dominant
group emerges over scarce resources such as access to jobs, housing, or education. In our context, there is
no specific competition between refugees and residents on treated islands over any of these resources. Our
study therefore shows that mere exposure to the refugee crisis is sufficient to fuel support for extreme-
right parties.
Our findings have also direct implications for policymakers regarding the management of refugee
flows in Europe. As our analysis demonstrates, a substantial part of the electoral backlash can be at-
tributed to the fact that some islands and townships received a disproportionately high number of asylum
seekers in a very short period of time. This, in turn, suggests that xenophobic repercussions among natives
might be mitigated if European governments were to invest more resources in supporting Mediterranean
countries in processing asylum claims and by allocating asylum seekers and refugees fairly across all
countries in the Common European Asylum System (Bansak et al. 2017). With more and more people
fleeing civil war, protracted conflicts, poverty, and natural disaster, there is no expectation that in the fore-
seeable future refugee migration will decrease substantially. If an important goal is to reduce electoral
backlash in EU countries of first arrival, European governments need greater cooperation and solidarity
in managing the current and future refugee crises.
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S1 Introduction
This Supporting Information is structured as follows: Following the introduction, the second section
provides more information about the unfolding of the refugee crisis in Greece, the timing of events,
the institutional set-up relevant for our empirical strategy and a discussion of the external validity of
our findings. The third section discusses the various data sources for election results, refugee arrivals,
and islands’ distance to the Turkish border. The fourth section provides descriptive statistics and
information about coding decisions. The fifth section provides more details about the difference-in-
difference (DID) and instrumental variable (IV) analyses. The last section reports additional results
referenced in the main paper and the SI Appendix, including further results of the DID, IV, and
intention-to-treat analyses, placebo tests, and effect estimates for parties other than Golden Dawn
(GD) as well as turnout.
S2 The refugee crisis in context
Greece is the European country that is arguably most strongly affected by the refugee crises due to its
proximity to the Turkish border (with Turkey being a major route through which refugees try to reach
the EU countries), a long coastline that marks the EU external borders, and many, difficult-to-patrol
islands. In 2015 alone, out of the 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers that reached EU soil for
the first time, more than 850,000 of them did so by arriving in one of the Greek Aegean islands [1].
Most refugees left the islands of first arrival within a very short period, typically less than 48 hours,
to continue their journeys via the port of Piraeus or Thessaloniki to central and northern Europe.
But while some islands were strongly affected by these sudden refugee inflows, many other islands did
not experience any contact with refugees and asylum seekers.
S2.1 Timing of events
The timing of events between the two elections (January and September 2015) is critical for our
empirical strategy. The short time that elapsed between the two elections, the speed with which the
crisis unfolded in the first half of 2015, the localization of the events, and the fact that the news cycle
and political agenda were dominated by the financial crises and capital controls all ensure that there
are limited spill-over effects (e.g. via interpersonal contacts or news coverage) across islands. For these
reasons, the political and economic impact of the refugee crisis—at least during its initial stages—was
mostly limited to the communities and islands that were directly affected by it and were receiving
new asylum seekers and refugees. Note that the presence of such spill-over effects from exposed to
unexposed islands would bias the absolute value of our estimate downwards.
S2.2 Institutional set-up
The second key element that we exploit in our identification strategy is a special feature of the Greek
electoral law (Law 3636/2008) which dictates that if a new general parliamentary election takes place
within a period of less than eighteen months since the last general election, then the electoral lists
must be closed (as opposed to open-list in regular cases) and the order of candidates must remain
unchanged from the last election. The law aims to prevent additional campaign spending by candidates
in such a short time interval and to eliminate the necessity for candidates to raise more money.
Thus, in the September 2015 election, the lists were closed, and the order of candidates remained
unchanged from January 2015. This, in turn, implies that voters were not given the opportunity
to express preferences over candidates within a given party list (only preferences over parties), and,
hence, individual candidates had no incentive to campaign. But most importantly, this feature of the
electoral law effectively guarantees that candidate quality (and ranking) remained constant between
the two elections, thus keeping the fundamentals of political competition between the two elections
almost unchanged. That is, both in treated and control islands, voters were presented in September
with the same party lists as they were in January.
In addition to this, most of the islands in the Aegean Sea belong to the same electoral and ad-
ministrative districts (NUTS-3). This ensures that they are identical on a plethora of observable and
unobservable characteristics such as the candidates running for office, regional government, police,
judiciary, and access to EU funds. Together, these institutional features lend further credibility to our
identification strategy by holding constant many potential sources of variation across municipalities.
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S2.3 External validity
Given that our identification strategy exploits a particular natural experiment in Greece, one could
raise legitimate questions on the generalizability of our findings. While we would advice against
over-claiming the external validity of our results, we believe that the effects and mechanisms that
we identify also has implications for other countries. Albeit not at this scale, the refugee crisis that
Greece experienced over spring and summer 2015 is not unprecedented. In the past, Greece as well
as other EU countries with extensive sea borders such as Italy, faced structurally similar situations.
Furthermore, the demographic and ethnic composition of the refugee population that arrived in Greece
is very similar to that in other EU countries. While we believe that external validity is best addressed
by replicating this study in other contexts, we may therefore expect to find a similar electoral reaction
to large-scale and sudden refugee inflows in other European democracies.
S3 Data
In our analysis, we use three different sources of data: electoral outcomes at the municipality and
township level, data on refugee arrivals (temporal and spatial), and geographic data (distance from
the Turkish coast). Below we describe in detail how we have collected, processed, and analyzed
our data. Upon publication, all data will be made publicly available at the dedicated Dataverse
doi:10.7910/DVN/XXXX.
S3.1 Electoral data
Our electoral data cover vote outcomes for all the parties that participated in the four Greek legislative
elections between May 2012 and September 2015. Our sample includes all inhabited Greek islands.
In administrative terms, each island might contain one or more municipalities (large islands such
as Crete and Evvoia contain more than one municipality, while smaller islands contain only one).
Electoral data are collected at the municipality and at the township level (some municipalities can have
multiple townships) using publicly available sources provided by the Greek Ministry of Interior and
Public Administration, the office that is responsible for conducting elections and reporting the official
results. The data we use is publicly available and freely accessible on the Ministry’s website (http:
//www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/NationalElections/Results/). The data include a) the number of
total votes cast, b) the number of votes that each party that participated in elections obtained, c) the
number of blank votes, d) the number of valid votes, e) the number of invalid votes, f) the number
of registered voters, and g) the number of voters who turned out to vote. Our empirical analysis is
based on the vote shares of GD and all other parties. In order to compute the vote share for each
party, we have divided the number of votes that each party received over the number of total valid
votes cast (that is, excluding blank votes).
S3.2 Refugee arrivals
Our study population consists of all inhabited islands in Greece. The units of analysis are either
at the municipality or township level. With the exceptions of Crete and Evvoia, the two largest
islands of the country, each island represents a separate municipality (see above). Municipalities
are further disaggregated into townships, thus offering within-island variation in refugee exposure.
Data on the number of refugee arrivals are obtained through the United Nations High Commission
on Refugees (UNHCR) and are publicly available on the UNHCR website (http://data.unhcr.
org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83). Data on arrivals are disaggregated at the island (i.e.
municipality) level and are available on a monthly basis. Data include aggregate information on the
country of origin of refugees, the month and the location of arrival (at the island or municipality level),
and other demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, etc.). We code an island (municipality) as
treated if it received a positive number of refugees in the period between February and September 2015,
when our analysis ends. To measure the intensity of treatment, we compute the cumulative number of
refugee arrivals per island inhabitant between February and September 2015. For this time period, we
compute the total number of asylum-seekers that arrived in each municipality. We divide this number
over the size of the local population that resides in this particular municipality (data obtained via
the Greek Ministry of Interior and Public Administration) to obtain our measure of the intensity of
treatment. For our analysis at the township level, we code as treated those townships with a hotspot
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center (points of first reception and recording of refugees on arrival) or a refugee camp, which is a
more permanent hospitality facility, or both. Information about the location of these facilities is also
obtained from the UNHCR (http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83). These
data do not provide a detailed breakdown of refugee arrivals (on a monthly basis) at the township
level, and, hence, we cannot compute a measure of the treatment intensity at the this level.
S3.3 Distance to Turkish border
Geographic data on the distance between our units of analysis (island or municipality) and the Turkish
coast were computed using the web mapping service developed by Google (https://www.google.com/
maps/) that provides satellite imagery and geospatial data visualization and measurement. For islands
that contain a single municipality, we computed the Euclidian distance between the population center
of this municipality and the most proximal point in the Turkish coast line as identified by Google
Maps. For islands that contain more than one municipality, the distance to the Turkish coast was
calculated for each individual municipality using the above algorithm.
S4 Descriptive statistics and Variable coding
S4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables S1 and S2 display the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis at the munici-
pality and township level.
Table S1: Descriptive statistics at the municipality level.
Mean SD Min Max
Binary treatment 0.13 0.33 0 1
Arrivals per capita 0.33 1.01 0 5
Log distance 4.86 1.24 0.59 6.23
Registered voters 485.43 180.17 92 1564
Valid votes 227.80 87.08 30 408
Turnout in Sep 2015 (%) 48.41 9.76 18.03 64.04
Turnout in Jan 2015 (%) 51.57 13.35 17.79 74.32
GD vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 6.02 2.47 0 17.51
GD vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 4.46 2.13 0 11.93
GD vote share in Jun 2012 (%) 5.44 2.37 0.483 12.62
GD vote share in Jan 2012 (%) 5.59 3.15 0.794 18.84
Nea Dimokratia vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 28.51 6.62 12.32 47.50
Nea Dimokratia vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 29.84 8.33 13.09 54.14
PASOK vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 8.93 3.99 1.639 21.14
PASOK vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 6.27 3.95 0 24.41
KKE vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 5.59 4.56 1.126 33.20
KKE vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 5.44 4.58 0 31.83
SYRIZA vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 34.80 6.43 14.17 49.81
SYRIZA vote share in Jan 2012 (%) 35.34 8.96 12.30 61.82
ANEL vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 3.66 1.86 0 10.59
ANEL vote share in Jan 2012 (%) 4.70 2.58 0 19.13
Municipalities 95
Notes: Table shows the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each variable used in the
analyses.
S4.2 Top coding
Figure S1 shows the distribution of the refugee arrivals among all treated islands. For all but one
treated islands, the number of refugee arrivals varies from fewer than one refugee for every resident
(Kalymnos) up to four and a half refugees per resident (Lesvos). The only exception is Agathonisi, a
tiny island with less than two hundred residents but a massive number of refugee arrivales. By the
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Table S2: Descriptive statistics at the township level.
Mean SD Min Max
Binary treatment 0.09 0.28 0 1
Registered voters 473.56 165.98 109 1564
Valid votes 231.97 92.67 34 459
Turnout in Sep 2015 (%) 49.42 10.27 16.84 69.84
Turnout in Jan 2015 (%) 54.08 13.78 12.22 77.09
GD vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 6.36 2.54 0 17.51
GD vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 4.63 2.14 0 11.93
Nea Dimokratia vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 27.18 7.15 8.441 52.20
Nea Dimokratia vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 28.01 8.77 9.472 56.48
PASOK vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 8.89 4.08 0 22.02
PASOK vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 5.88 3.34 0 24.41
KKE vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 6.27 5.08 0.345 37.35
KKE vote share in Jan 2015 (%) 5.99 5.11 0 36.37
SYRIZA vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 35.42 6.87 12.96 52.66
SYRIZA vote share in Jan 2012 (%) 36.95 8.81 8.108 67.86
ANEL vote share in Sep 2015 (%) 3.52 1.92 0 17.62
ANEL vote share in Jan 2012 (%) 4.77 3.62 0 32.93
Townships 248
Notes: Table shows the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each variable used in the
analyses.
end of ours study period, Agathonisi received 125 times more refugees than its resident population.
The huge gap between Agathonisi and the rest of the islands generates an extreme interpolation in
our estimation. To avoid this problem, we top-code Agathonisi, using the value of five, still the highest
in the data. The second panel of the figure shows the distribution of refugee arrivals after top-coding,
which we use for further analysis. This strategy does not affect the binary treatment analysis.
Figure S1: The distribution of refugee arrivals with and without top-coding.
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Note: The left panel shows the density of refugees per capita and illustrates the interpolation problem caused by one
island, Agathonisi, which has received 125 times more refugees than its resident population. The right panel shows the
same distribution when we top-code Agathonisi at five (the maximum value in the data).
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S5 Estimation strategies
We use two complementary identification strategies: DID estimation that relies on changes in the
number of refugee arrivals and voting behavior over time and IV analysis that additionally leverages
the distance to the Turkish coast as an instrument for the number of refugee arrivals. We briefly
describe each estimation strategy below.
S5.1 DID analysis
Our DID model uses municipalities or townships as the unit of analysis. Below, we present the
municipality-level specification thebut one for townships is completely analogous. Two estimate the
effect of refugee inflows on GD vote share, we use a two-way fixed effects regression given by
GDs,t = γs + λt + δDIDTs,t + us,t ,
where GDs,t is the local vote share for GD in municipality s and election t; γs is a municipality
fixed effect that rules out omitted variable bias from unobserved municipality characteristics that
are invariant over our study period; λt is an election fixed effect to control for common factors that
change nonlinearly over time, Ts,t is the (binary or continuous) treatment indicator measuring refugee
exposure, and us,t is an idiosyncratic error term. The quantity of interest is δDID, which identifies the
effect of refugee inflows on GD vote share based on the within-municipality variation among munici-
palities that have received refugees between spring and summer 2015 (the average treatment effect for
the treated). As a robustness check, we further relax the model specification and add municipality-
specific linear time trends. This ensures that all unobserved municipality-specific differences that vary
smoothly over time (such as local trends in voter preferences) are purged from the estimate of δDID.
S5.2 IV analysis
In the IV analysis, identification relies solely on the exogenous variation in the distance to the Turkish
coast, our instrument. In order to serve as a valid instrument, three assumptions have to hold. First,
islands close to the Turkish coast have to have a higher propensity (or number) of refugee arrivals
(first stage). Second, distance to the Turkish coast can only affect changes in GD vote share through
refugee exposure (exclusion restriction). Third, we have to rule out any other time-varying confounder
that affect closer islands more (less) than islands further away and simultaneously impacts changes
in GD vote share (independence of the instrument). Under these assumptions, we can consistently
estimate the impact of refugee exposure on changes in GD vote shares using two-stage least squares
(2SLS) regression. The first stage is given by:
Ts = α+ βZs + vs ,
where Ts is the binary (or continuous) treatment indicator of refugee exposure, Zi is the logged
distance to the Turkish coast, α an estimated constant, β the coefficient measuring the strength of
the first stage, and vi an idiosyncratic error term. The second stage regression is given by
∆GDs = γ + δIV Tˆs + us
where ∆GDs is the change in GD vote share between January and September 2015, Tˆs is the instru-
mented treatment indicator; γ an estimated constant; and us an idiosyncratic error term assumed to
be orthogonal to vs. Here, the quantity of interest is δIV , which identifies the causal effect of refugee
exposure on change in GD vote share by leveraging the distance to the Turkish coast as an instrument.
Table S1 displays the results of the IV analysis. Models 1 and 3 present the results of the first-stage
estimation of the binary and continuous (arrivals per resident) treatment models, while Models 2 and
4 present the results of the corresponding second-stage estimation. Model 5 shows the intention-to-
treat analysis for all four elections and confirms that distance to the Turkish coast only has an effect
on GD vote share in the September 2015 election, after the onset of the refugee crisis.
With only 20 districts, the clustered standard errors in Table might be biased. In order to assess
this issue, Table S4 replicates Models 1–4 above but uses the bootstrap to calculate standard errors.
We find that the standard errors are virtually identical.
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Table S3: 2SLS regressions of change in GD vote share on refugee exposure instrumented by
distance to the Turkish coast.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: Difference in GD vote share: January to September 2015 GD vote share
Treatment: Binary Treatment Arrivals per capita Distance to coast
Stage: First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage Reduced Form
Log Distance -0.208 -0.568 -0.203
(0.031) (0.102) (0.354)
Instrumented refugee arrivals 2.080 0.739
(0.478) (0.173)
2012 June -1.074(0.869)
2012 January -0.893(0.894)
2015 September 2.769(0.657)
2012 Jun × Log Distance 0.190
(0.171)
2015 Jan × Log Distance 0.048
(0.181)
2015 Sep × Log Distance -0.481
(0.143)
Constant 1.136 1.295 3.103 1.290 6.574
(0.168) (0.104) (0.552) (0.173) (1.785)
F statistic 46.21 31.08
N 95 95 94 94 380
Notes: Models 1 and 3 display the coefficients of the first stage of a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Models 2
and 4 show the coefficients of the corresponding second stage. Model 5 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients
of the reduced form regression of GD vote share on the distance from the Turkish Coast. Standard errors, shown in
parentheses, are clustered at the district level in models 1–4, and at the municipal level in model 5.
Table S4: IV estimates using bootstrapped standard errors.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Difference in GD vote share: January to September 2015
Treatment Binary Treatment Treatment Intensity
Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
Log Distance -0.208 -0.568
(0.031) (0.102)
Instrumented Refugee Arrivals 2.083 0.739
(0.529) (0.202)
Constant 1.136 1.295 3.103 1.290
(0.168) (0.103) (0.552) (0.096)
F statistic 46.21 31.08
N 95 95 94 94
Notes: Models 1 and 3 display the coefficients of the first stage of a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Models 2
and 4 show the coefficients of the corresponding second stage. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are bootstrapped
with 300 replication samples.
S6 Additional results
S6.1 Proximity to refugee hotspots and changes in GD vote shares
S6.2 Visualization of DID estimates
S6.3 Intent-to-treat effect
To further investigate the relationship between distance from the Turkish coast and GD support, we
estimate a regression model in which we interact logged distance with each election-dummy (using the
May 2012 election as baseline). The results are presented in Table S5. We see that distance from the
Turkish coast has no effect on GD vote share in the May 2012, June 2012 and January 2015 elections.
Only for the September 2015 election, after the onset of the refugee crisis, do we find that logged
distance decreases the vote share for GD, and significantly more so than for the May 2012 baseline
election. The difference in the slope between 2015 and May 2012 is -0.423 (std. error 0 .155, two-tailed
p < 0.007); between September 2015 and June 2012 -0.676 (std. error 0.133, two-tailed p < 0.001);
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Figure S2: Townships that hosted refugees experienced a higher increase in GD vote shares than townships on
the same island that did not. Panel A indicates the townships on Aegan islands that received refugees during the
period from January to September 2015. Panel B shows the change in the GD vote share during the same period.
A B
Figure S3: DID estimates of the impact of refugee arrivals on GD vote shares and placebo tests
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Notes: The red and blue dots denote DID regression coefficient of the average treatment effect on the treated. The
horizontal bars display the 95% confidence intervals. Models 1, 5, and 9 show the treatment effects (red dots) of
the baseline model for binary treatment (municipalities), binary treatment (townships), and continuous treatment
(municipalities), respectively. Models 2, 6, and 10 (red dots) use the same specification but also include unit-specific
trends (s-trends). Models 3, 7, and 11 (blue dots) show the estimates of baseline placebo models, while models 4, 8,
and 12 (blue dots) show the estimates of the placebo models with s-trends.
and between September 2015 and January 2015 -0.463 (std. error 0.116, two-tailed p < 0.001). Figure
S4 visualizes this pattern, showing the marginal effect of logged distance on GD vote share for each
of the four elections.
S6.4 Additional placebo tests
In addition to the placebo tests using pre-crisis elections, we can also exploit a specific feature of the
Greek electoral law for an additional placebo test. In Greece, in the absence of postal votes, registered
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Table S5: Intention-to-treat effect of distance to the Turkish coast on GD vote share.
Intention-to-treat effect
(Logged) Distance from the Coast -0.203
(0.354)
2012 June -1.074
(0.869)
2015 January -0.893
(0.894)
2015 September 2.769
(0.657)
Logged Distance X 2012 June 0.190
(0.171)
Logged Distance X 2015 January 0.048
(0.181)
Logged Distance X 2015 September -0.481
(0.143)
Constant 6.574
(1.785)
N 380
Clusters 95
Figure S4: Intention-to-treat effect of distance to the Turkish coast on GD vote share.
2012 May
2012 June
2015 January
2015 September
−2 −1 0 1 2
Treatment Effect
Intent−To−Treat Effect
l
l
l
l
Notes: The red (blue) dots denote the intention-to-treat effect of logged distance on GD vote share for the September
2015 (pre-refugee crisis) elections. The black bars display 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered at
the municipality level.
non-resident voters are allowed to vote in the area that they reside, in special polling stations and
separate ballot boxes for the electoral district in which they are registered to vote. Their ballots are
then collected and counted separately. This means that voters who are registered in treated or control
islands but reside in other parts of Greece voted in their area of current residency but used the exact
same electoral lists that voters on the islands received. This allows us to examine the behavior of
non-residents who are registered to vote on islands with refugee exposure. As an example, consider
a non-resident voter registered in Lesvos who currently resides on the mainland in Athens, and was
therefor not directly exposed to the refugee arrivals on her home island. We leverage this setting for
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a DID analysis that uses as a placebo treatment group the non-resident voters of the treated islands.
We conduct two sets of placebo sets. For the first test, we compare non-resident voters of treated
islands to non-resident voters of control islands. In the second placebo test, we compare non-resident
voters of treated islands to resident voters of control islands. For both tests, Figure S5 shows that
changes in vote shares across the different groups, whereas Figure S6 displays the treatment effects
with and without municipality-specific trends. The placebo tests confirm that electoral support for
GD did not increase substantially among non-resident voters originating from treated islands between
the two elections in 2015 when compared to i) non-resident voters of the control islands (see left panels
of Figures S5 and S6) or ii) to the resident voters of the control islands (see right panels of Figures S5
and S6). If anything, they appear less prone to increase their electoral support for GD compared to
resident voters from control islands, which implies that our estimates are most likely a lower bound
of the impact of refugee arrivals.
Figure S5: DID placebo estimates comparing non-resident voters from treated islands with resident
voters from control islands.
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Notes: The left panel shows that non-resident voters registered to vote in treated islands do not differ from non-resident
voters from control islands in their change of support for GD. The right panel shows that non-resident voters originating
from treated islands are, if anything, less likely increase support for GD party compared to resident voters from control
islands.
S6.5 Impact on turnout and vote shares of other parties
In this section, we explore the effect that exposure to the refugee crisis has on overall turnout and the
electoral performance of the other parliamentary parties that contested the January and September
2015 elections. Employing the same DID and IV analysis used to generate the main results, we
replicate them using the vote share for each of the other parliamentary parties and find no significant
changes for all of them except for the center-right Nea Dimokratia, which incurred losses between 1
and 4 percentage points depending on the specification. Nea Dimokratia, whose electoral agenda was
dominated by economic issues and the financial bail-out negotiations, was SYRIZA’s major competitor
in the January and September 2015 elections. Tables S6 and S7 report the estimates. In addition,
treated islands also experienced higher levels of turnout between 1 and 5 percentage points depending
on the specification. Taken together, these results suggest that in treated islands, GD successfully
attracted former voters of the Nea Dimokratia as well as mobilized additional voters that have not
participated in the January 2015 election.
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Figure S6: Placebo tests: Resident vs. non-resident voters.
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Placebo 2: Non−Resident Treated Voters Vs Resident Control
Notes: The black dots show the ATET from the DID regression. Solid black lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The
placebo tests shows that GD vote share did not increase among non-resident voters of treated islands when compared
to non-resident voters of control islands (left panel) or resident voters of control islands (right panel).
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S6.6 Sensitivity Analysis: Distance From Turkish coast
Distance from the Turkish coast plays a key role in our identification strategy, because it helps us
predict which islands were exposed to refugee arrivals and which ones were not. Implicitly this logic
assumes that distance from the coast is not related to other potential determinants of change in GD
vote share between the post- and pre-treatment elections. Although this assumption can be expected
to hold locally, in the part of the Aegean sea that is relatively close to the coast, it might not hold
when we expand the radius to all islands in the country. To examine whether this is the case, we
repeat the main analyses, focusing on islands closer to the Turkish coast. Distance ranges from one
to more than 530 klm. We use various cut-off points, from 500 and up to 50 klm. Using each cut-off
point as the maximum distance to the coast, we repeat both the DID and the IV analysis. The
results of this exercise are shown in Figure S7. As expected the level of uncertainty increases as
the maximum distance to Turkish coast decreases. Yet, throughout the range, all treatment effect
estimates remain remarkably robust.1 This is the case even when we include unit-specific linear trends
in the DID analysis. The evidence seems to rule out the possibility that the effects are due to some
distance-related confounder.
As a a way to further assess the role of distance to the coast, we use it as a predictor of a series of
socioeconomic indicators. There results are shown in Table S8. We use population, area (in Km2),
population density, GDP (p/c), unemployment, an indicator about tourist activity in the area and
rates of foreign population. Exact information about the measurement of these indicators is provided
in the note of the table. Distance does not seem to predict to any of these outcomes. This evidence
matches well the results of the main text, as well as Table S5 and Figure S4, which show that distance
is unrelated to change in GD vote share in the pre-treatment period.
Table S8: Balance Tests.
Area # Inhabitants Population Unemployment % Non-Natives Tourism GDP p/c
Km2 (2011) Density (2011) Rate (2011) (2011) (2014) (2014)
Logged -235.4 -16.10 6.362 0.414 -0.141 1.698 158.6
Distance (2638.2) (35.68) (4.968) (0.334) (0.168) (1.579) (165.4)
n 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Notes: Table shows the OLS coefficient of (logged) distance to Turkish coast as predictor of each of the variables shown
in the first row of the table. Standard errors in parentheses. Tourism stands for the percentage of bed occupancy in
hotel accommodation. Source: XXX.
S6.7 Alternative inference strategies for the DID estimates
An oft-neglected problem with difference-in-differences estimates is that conventional standard errors
are inconsistent, because they ignore the serial correlation stemming from repeated measurements
over time. We try to address this problem of intra-class correlation in our main analysis by cluster-
ing observations either at the municipality or the township level, depending on the unit of analysis.
Alternative methods have been suggested, however. We employ those that seem to perform best with
small number of units (Bertrand et al. 2004): block bootstrapping and ignoring time-series informa-
tion. Moreover, we perform a set of permutation-based placebo tests, which help to shed light on the
variance of the DID estimators used in the main analysis.
Block Bootstrap
1 The only exception here is the IV estimate when including islands up to 50 klm from the Turkish
coast. No island more than 50 klm far from the Turkish coast received refugees. However, not
all islands within this range were treated. Some did not receive refugees (e.g. Rhodes, Nisiros).
This makes distance a weak instrument within this range, resulting into a non-significant first stage
(OLS coefficient -0.111 with std error 0.091), which in turn generates second-level 2SLS estimates
characterized by high levels of uncertainty, as shown in the graph. Increasing the threshold to 100
klm is sufficient to turn distance into a strong instrument of refugee exposure (OLS coefficient -0.277
with std error 0.032), yielding reliable second-stage estimates.
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Figure S7: Sensitivity of the Effects to Distance from Turkish Coast.
Note: Each entry denotes the treatment effect of refugee exposure on GD vote share, conditional on the distance from
the Turkish coast. The horizontal axis indicates the maximum distance from the Turkish coast in each analysis. The
vertical spikes encapsulate the 95% confidence intervals.
The block bootstrapped analysis is shown in Table S9. Municipalities (Model 1and Model 2 for the
binary treatment and Model 5 and 6 for refugee exposure) and townships (Model 3 and Model 4) are
resampled with replacement (1000 iterations). The DID estimator is used in each bootstrapped sam-
ple. The variance of the resulting empirical distribution of treatment effect estimates is used to derive
the standard errors. As show in the Table, block bootstrapping causes no change in our inference
about the effect of refugee exposure on GD vote share.
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Table S9: Impact of refugee arrivals on GD vote share, block bootstrapped standard errors.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: GD(t) GD(t−1) GD(t) GD(t−1) GD(t) GD(t−1)
Treatment: Binary treatment Binary treatment Arrivals per capita
Unit: Municipality Township Municipality
Exposure 2.079 -0.040 2.272 0.093 0.604 -0.004
(0.348) (0.340) (0.281) (0.265) (0.179) (0.106)
Unit FE X X X X X X
Election FE X X X X X X
N 380 285 992 744 379 284
Elections 4 3 4 3 4 3
Clusters 95 95 248 248 95 95
Notes: Models 1–6 display ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with
block-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Models 1-4 use a binary treatment
indicator while models 5 and 6 use the number of refugee arrivals per capita. Models 1,
3 and 5 show the effect on GD vote share (in red). Models 2, 4 and 6 use the GD vote
share from the previous election as placebo outcome (in blue). All models control for
election and unit of analysis (municipality or township) fixed effects.
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Ignoring Time-Series Information
Another, relatively conservative, approach, which however seems to perform well with even low num-
ber of units is to ignore the time dimension in the data, by collapsing all observations into one
pre-treatment period. We do this in two ways. First, we take the average of the GD vote share in
all pre-treatment elections (Models 1–3); second, we use only the last pre-treatment election, January
2015 (Models 4–6). We present the results from this exercise in Table S10. Again, inference remains
intact to this exercise. The resulting estimates are remarkably close to those reported in the main
analysis.
Table S10: Impact of refugee arrivals on GD vote share: Pre-Post Analysis.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: GD(t) GD(t) GD(t) GD(t) GD(t) GD(t)
Treatment: Binary treatment Arrivals p.c. Binary treatment Arrivals p.c.
Unit: Municipality Township Municipality Municipality Township Municipality
Exposure 2.079 2.272 0.604 2.105 2.210 0.606
(0.351) (0.263) (0.178) (0.385) (0.290) (0.171)
Unit FE X X X X X X
Post-Period X X X X X X
N 190 496 190 190 496 190
Time Points 2 2 2 2 2 2
Clusters 95 248 95 95 248 95
Notes: All models display ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with clustered standard errors in
parentheses. Pre-treatment elections have been collapsed into one pre-treatment observation. Models 1–3 use
the average GD vote share in all elections prior to refugee arrivals as the pre-treatment observation for each
municipality. Models 4–6 use only the last election prior to refugee arrivals, January 2015, as the pre-treatment
observation for each municipality. Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 use a binary treatment indicator while models 3 and
6 use the number of refugee arrivals per capita. All models include a post-period dummy and municipality (or
township) fixed effects.
Randomization Inference
Finally, we also implemented two sets of permutation-based tests. The first uses all units and randomly
apply the treatment status to few of them (the same number as the number originally treated).
Permutations are taken at the municipality (or township) level. After each permutation we end up
with a set of municipalities (or townships) being treated. We implement the DID analysis for all
permutations and plot the treatment effect estimates in the first column of Figure S8. The first row
presents the municipality-based empirical distribution of 2,000 such estimates, whereas the second
row displays the empirical distribution from the township-based analysis. The second column repeats
this exericse but using only the control islands. Again, 2,000 placebo treatment effects are estimated.
Each distribution is compared to the treatment effect obtained from the original dataset. The results
confirm previous analyses in that it seems quite unlikely that our original treatment effect estimates
are due to sheer chance.
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Figure S8: Permutation-based evaluation of the DID effects.
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Note: Each graph displays 2,000 treatment effect estimates, based on placebo difference-in-difference analyses. The first
two sets of analyses are based on randomly assigning municipalities in the post-treatment period into treatment and
control condition. The last two panels follow the same procedure but the analysis is implemented at the township level
and thus assigns treatment randomly to townships in the post-treatment period. In the two panels of the first column,
2,000 permutations are drawn from the full set of islands. In the second column graphs, 2,000 permutations are drawn
from the set of control municipalities (townships). In both analysis permutations are clustered at the municipality
(township level. The vertical red dashed line in each graph denotes the treatment effect from the original analysis.
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